The Civil War in China, March, 1927-October 1, 1949
Source Database: DISCovering World History
Table of Contents
Further Readings | Source Citation
Conflict between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists
Principal Personages
Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), leader of the Republican Revolution and the Kuomintang
Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), late President of the Republic of China and Nationalist military leader during China's Civil War
Chu Teh (1886-1976), Commander of Chinese Communist forces who helped Mao Tse-tung in 1928 organize the Fourth Red Army and establish the Communist base in Kiangsi
Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976), leader of the Chinese Communist Party and founder of the People's Republic of China
Chang Hsüeh-liang (1898- ), known as the Young Marshal, he became warlord of Manchuria in 1928, and later fraternized with the Chinese Communist forces for which he was arrested by Chiang Kai-shek
George Catlett Marshall (1880-1959), United States Ambassador to China who led the mission to mediate an end to the Civil War, 1945-1947; and United States Secretary of State, 1947-1949
Summary of Event
To bring China out of the chaos caused by warlordism in the 1920's, Sun Yat-sen sought to revitalize the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and direct a military unification under the Party's leadership. Communists were invited to join the Kuomintang in 1923 and to participate in the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek in 1926, a year after Sun had died. While regrouping in the Yangtze Valley in 1927, the Nationalist-Communist alliance grew strained. The Communists' independent action to organize strikes, engage in sabotage, and create mass organizations, all in defiance of Kuomintang policy, led to suspicion and enmity between the two groups. An open break resulted, and the Nationalists and Communists came into conflict.
When the Chinese Communists rejected the Kuomintang alliance, they established rural soviets in South China, beginning in late 1927. In April, 1928, while Chiang Kai-shek's forces were conquering north China, Chu Teh joined Mao Tse-tung to form the Fourth Red Army. The soviets and the Red Army, with its disciplined and indoctrinated troops experienced in guerrilla warfare, became the focal points of Communist strength. They also became the target of Chiang Kai-shek's five "extermination campaigns," from 1930 to 1934. The final target was the large Kiangsi soviet where Mao Tse-tung had risen to prominence but whose position was threatened in 1934 by intraparty struggles. Chiang's strike against the Communist headquarters at Juichin led to the Long March which began with 100,000 Communist troops and officials on October 15, 1934. The difficult trek through inhospitable terrain, harassed by hostile forces, took its toll. When the Communists set up new headquarters at Yenan in Shensi province in December, 1936, only about thirty thousand bedraggled men were left.
A significant event in the Long March occurred during a pause at Tsunyi in northern Kweichow province in January, 1935. At an organizational conference, Mao Tse-tung was made head of the Party's Politburo and Secretariat; and his emphasis on guerrilla strategy and peasant organization would prevail.
Later in the same year, Chinese Communist strategy shifted in accord with Comintern policy, which directed Communist alliances with anti-Fascist groups. In 1936, the Chinese Communists urged a "United Front" among all parties against Japanese encroachment. Chiang Kai-shek was reluctant to cooperate with the Communists; but some of his leading commanders, such as Chang Hsüeh-liang in northeast China, wanted to end the Civil War. Chiang went to Sian in December, 1936, to meet with Chang and the Commander of a Northwest Army to gain their support. In the bizarre sequence that followed, Chang arrested Chiang and demanded an end to the Civil War. When it appeared that the mutinous anti-Chiang troops might widen the internal conflict, the Communists came to mediate at Sian on Chiang's behalf. Chang Hsüeh-liang released Chiang and flew to Nanking with him, whereupon Chiang Kai-shek put his rebellious Commander under house arrest. Reluctantly, Chiang now led a United Front against Japan.
Before the Japanese attack on China in July, 1937, the Communists and Nationalists discussed United Front arrangements. The Communists pledged in part to end sabotage, sovietization, and the confiscation of landlord holdings, and to reorganize the Red Army and place it under the Nationalists' Military Commission. The Communists took advantage of this reprieve from Nationalist attacks by expanding and strengthening their base in northern China. When the Sino-Japanese War came to a virtual stalemate in 1939, tension developed between the Nationalists and Communists, leading to a serious military clash in January, 1941. Periodic negotiations in 1943 and 1944 resulted in Communist demands for a coalition government and more army divisions, followed by a Nationalist refusal. The United Front fell apart in recrimination.
When the war ended in 1945, the Communists were in a stronger position than when it began. They controlled eighteen "liberated areas" in several north China provinces with a population of one hundred million. An estimated one million troops and a larger militia provided security and an attack force that moved quickly at the war's end to take over the Japanese surrender. The Nationalists, far away in the West from strategic areas in north China, tried to get the Japanese not to surrender to the Communists. With American help, Nationalist troops managed to occupy strategic northern cities, while Communist forces concentrated mainly on the countryside, aided by Russian forces occupying Manchuria.
To prevent a civil war from developing out of the scramble for territory, Mao met with Chiang at Chungking, the Nationalists' wartime capital. While Mao was conciliatory and both sides agreed on principles, each side sought control. Disarming the Japanese and control of local affairs in north China were among points of disagreement. In Manchuria, meanwhile, a half million of Chiang's best troops stationed in cities fought a losing battle to Communist guerrillas based in the countryside. When the Soviets left Manchuria in May, 1946, most of the area was occupied by the Chinese Communists.
As the military situation deteriorated for the Nationalists, diplomatic efforts were made for a compromise solution. After Patrick J. Hurley failed in his mission to China, George C. Marshall was sent in December, 1945, to bring about a coalition government of all parties. Marshall's proposals for a cease fire, convening a Political Consultative Conference, and uniting Nationalist and Communist forces into a national army were favorably received. Mistrust again hindered implementation of an agreement, however, as both sides jostled for advantage and control. When intense fighting broke out in Manchuria in April, 1946, the Marshall mission was doomed. It was extremists on both sides, Marshall believed, who caused the irreparable break. The Nationalists then went their own way and called for a National Assembly to meet in November, 1946, and the Communists refused to participate.
From the summer of 1946 to the summer of 1947, a new Nationalist offensive was succeeding and taking its toll on the Communists in north China. In March, 1947, the Communists had even lost their capital of Yenan, and by June had lost 191,000 square kilometers of land. The summer of 1947, however, was a turning point in the Civil War when the expanded Communist forces took the offensive. Outmaneuvering the Nationalists in Manchuria again, the Communists captured large numbers of Chiang's best troops and considerable American equipment. In the fall of 1948, the Nationalist defense began to crumble rapidly. After more victories in Shantung province in September, 1948, the Communists proceeded south to Nanking. Entire divisions of Nationalists began to surrender. After the Communist occupation of Peking in January, 1949, the Communists refused to negotiate further, as they saw victory near. On October 1, 1949, the Communists proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Remaining Nationalists in south China left for Taiwan in December, 1949.
FURTHER READINGS
- Johnson, Chalmers A. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945. Stanford University Press, 1962.
- Pepper, Suzanne. Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. University of California Press, 1978.
- Eastman, Lloyd E. The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937. Harvard University Press, 1974.
Argues that Nationalist shortcomings were due to causes beyond the Kuomintang's control
- Kataoka, Tetsuya. Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front. University of California Press, 1974.
Supports a conservative theory that places stress more on the military as a primary factor in consolidating Communist power and less on peasant revolt
- Rosinger, Lawrence K. China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944. Princeton University Press, 1944.
Sketches briefly some of the major political developments in Nationalist China and how they were affected by the course of the war and the economic upheaval
- Liu, Frederick F. A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949. Kennikat Press, 1972.
Traces the development of military and political forces within the Nationalist government, the Kuomintang Party, and the Communist Party
- Melby, John F. The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War, China 1945-49. University of Toronto Press, 1968.
A diplomat's account of the Chinese Civil War with diary excerpts and narrative explanations
- Selden, Mark. The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Harvard University Press, 1971.
An excellent analysis of Mao's revolutionary.policies which expanded the Communist following substantially between 1935 and 1947
- Tien, Hung-mao. Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937. Stanford University Press, 1972.
Supplements Eastman's book and concentrates on patterns of political development and administration, concluding that the Kuomintang could not have indefinitely stemmed the tide of Communist success
- Van Slyke, Lyman P. Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History. Stanford University Press, 1967.
Traces the United Front theme as it developed in the Chinese Communist Party since 1935, emphasizing Mao's view
Source Citation: "The Civil War in China, March, 1927-October 1, 1949." DISCovering World History. Online Edition. Gale, 2003. Reproduced in History Resource Center. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale. http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/HistRC/
Document Number: CD2105241409
